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1 For those who are old enough to remember, 1990 was the year that South African Prime
Minister F. W. Klerk released Nelson Mandela from Robben Island, along with other
ANC political prisoners like Walter Sisulu and Govan Mbeki. That last name may not be
as familiar as the first. But Govan Mbeki was an important figure in the anti-apartheid
struggle. In that same mythic year, Thabo Mbeki (Govan’s eldest son) returned to South
Africa for the first time in nearly three decades. It was a reunion of man, father, and
country: “In a rare public display of emotion in Cape Town, he stood next to his father
and wept,  betraying the ‘stiff  upper lip’  self-control  and stoicism inculcated by his
years of English training” (pp. 65-66).
2 Thabo Mbeki (b. 1942), like Nelson Mandela, was born in rural Transkei. The two men
shared Xhosa roots. He came from a family of Xhosa izifundizwa (educated ones) deeply
involved  in  the  struggle  for  racial  justice.  Thabo’s  father  had  attended  the  same
secondary school as Mandela, and the same Fort Hare College, and was also convicted
and sentenced to jail for life alongside Mandela at the infamous Rivonia Trial in 1964.
Govan had by then abandoned his wife and children for political activism. Due to his
absence, Thabo Mbeki grew up largely without a father. The ANC would become his
family, and Oliver Tambo his adopted father. Practically orphaned, Mbeki became an
introverted loner, someone who excelled in school, but was aloof. His parents, English
style, sent him off to boarding school, to Lovedale College in Eastern Cape—the “Eton of
Africa”—where he learned to wear the blazer and school tie and to assimilate into the
Cape’s elite anglophone culture. (The illustration on the cover shows him smoking a
briar  pipe.)  An  educated  “black  Englishman,”  Thabo  won  a  scholarship  to  study
economics at  the University of  Sussex,  England,  where he developed his  trademark
urbane, cosmopolitan demeanor.
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3 He had also travelled to Moscow during the Cold War when the USSR supported the
Black  struggle  against  the  apartheid  regime,  and  lived  in  Zambia,  Swaziland,  and
Nigeria  during  his  many  years  in  the  external  ANC.  “Lacking  a  cultural  core,  the
nomadic Mbeki necessarily improvised a polyglot identity that was neither completely
African nor European,” (p. 17) writes Adekeye Adebajo in this portrait which came out
in Ohio University’s wonderful Short Histories of Africa series of professionally edited
paperbacks that provide concise guides to noteworthy events and great lives. Adekeye
himself  has  a  polyglot  identity.  A Nigerian-born Rhodes Scholar  who studied at  St.
Anthony’s College in Oxford, then the Fletcher School in Boston, before running the
Centre  for  Conflict  Resolution  in Cape  Town  and  joining  the  University  of
Johannesburg; Ade may explicitly reject Carlyle’s “Great Man” view of history (p. 10)
yet he nevertheless empathizes with Mbeki, and at times reveals as much about himself
as his subject: “It is often said that exiles keep journeying but somehow never quite
arrive at their destination” (p. 65).
4 This eminently readable life story relies for its documentation on the work of previous
biographers,  especially Mark Gevisser’s  Thabo  Mbeki:  The  Dream  Deferred (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), and Adrian Hadland and Jovial Rantao’s The Life and Times of
Thabo Mbeki (Rivonia: Zebra, 1999), as well as on more popular cinematic works such as
the 2009 movie Endgame, which portrayed Mbeki’s secret negotiations with the white
South African business community that led to the Harare Declaration of 1989, resulting
in the ANC being unbanned, and Mandela’s release from prison in 1990.
5 The  leitmotif  of  Adebajo’s  portrait  is  that  Mbeki  was  a  complex  figure,  full  of
contradictions and paradoxes who, because of his aloof and polyglot personality, may
have  failed  to  achieve  his  domestic  agenda  during  his  presidency  (1999-2008),  but
because of his Pan-African vision knew major foreign policy accomplishments. Adebajo,
a lifelong disciple of Ali Mazrui, and presently director of UJ’s Institute for Pan-African
Thought,  compares Mbeki to the great Pan-Africanist Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. A
specialist in international relations, Adebajo’s biography of Mbeki is distinguished by
his professional interest in Mazrui’s ideal of Pan-Africanism and the potential for South
Africa to contribute to the continent’s “dream deferred.”
6 A founder of the African Union (AU), Mbeki became that Pan-African organization’s
first  chair in 2002-2007.  He participated in the creation of the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001, and at the AU summit in Durban launching the
African Peer Review Mechanism in 2002 to promote adherence to the AU’s principles of
democracy.  His  “quiet  diplomacy”  with  Mugabe’s  Zimbabwe,  his  “Cape-to-Congo”
expansion  of  the  South  African  Development  Community  (SADC)  into  Kabila’s
Democratic Republic of Congo, his accession of South Africa into what started as an
exclusively Brazilian-Russian-Indian-Chinese alliance to create BRICS (with an “S”), his
bilateral  partnership with Obasanjo to turn the two regional hegemons Nigeria and
South Africa  into  major  trading  partners,  and most  of  all,  his  ideal  of  an  “African
Renaissance,” mark Mbeki’s foreign policy as his “most noteworthy legacy” (p. 111).
7 This notwithstanding, his domestic presidency was less impressive. Having spent his
entire career working as a protégé of his mentor Oliver Tambo, Mbeki found himself
orphaned once more when Tambo died in 1993, and scrambled for the patronage of
another  ANC  grandee,  Nelson  Mandela,  with  whom  he  had  a  more  complicated
relationship.  Despite  their  shared  Xhosa  Transkei  background,  Mandela  was
charismatic and hugely popular with a broad mass of his fellow South Africans. Mbeki
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was bureaucratic and relied on political intrigue and backroom deals within the new
ruling party. Mandela had lived almost his whole life in South Africa. Mbeki had spent
28  years  outside  the  country,  in  both  Europe  and  Africa.  Mandela  ruled  like  a
constitutional monarch leaving policy to his ministers. Mbeki was a workaholic who
micromanaged affairs to a degree that often turned allies into enemies. Working in
Mandela’s shadow as the ANC deputy president, while ostensibly serving his country’s
iconic hero, Mbeki from that umbrage was also preparing for his own succession.
8 In reality, Mbeki had been the actual chief executive of post-apartheid South Africa
during  the  transition.  “Though  Mandela  was  nominally  in  charge  of  the  country
between  1994  and  1999,  the  septuagenarian  patriarch  effectively  handed  over  the
chairing of cabinet meetings to the two deputy presidents, Mbeki and F. W. de Klerk,
and largely served as a ceremonial president, leaving the day-to-day running of the
country mainly to Thabo” (p. 71). Therefore, the ANC’s failure to follow its transfer of
political  power  from  a  White  minority  to  a  Black  majority  with  a  commensurate
transfer of economic power can legitimately be placed at the feet of Mandela’s heir
apparent.  What  Mbeki  did domestically  with his  quiet  influence was to  negotiate  a
transfer of wealth to a new South African elite under the guise of “Black Economic
Empowerment.”
9 Adebajo considers alternative possible worlds when he describes the rivalry between
Mbeki and the more radical Chris Hani who famously challenged him for the deputy
presidency of the ANC. Elders in the party convinced both men to step down. Mbeki
then experienced one of the most difficult periods in his life. It ended only in 1993,
when he took the ANC chairmanship from Oliver Tambo and a right-wing extremist
assassinated  Chris  Hani  outside  his  Johannesburg  home.  “If  he had  not  been
murdered,” Adebajo counterfactually suggests, “many have speculated that the popular
and  charismatic  Chris  Hani  might  well  have  acceded  to  the  country’s  presidency
instead of Mbeki in June 1999” (p. 69).
10 Mbeki’s domestic presidency was anything but Hani’s radical nationalization and land
redistribution  as  promised  by  the  ANC  during  its  long  struggle  against  apartheid.
Instead Mbeki implemented his Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) policy
designed  to  assure  investors:  “GEAR  was  pure  alchemy,”  writes  Adebajo  in  his  oft
poetical style: “a futile attempt to turn lead into gold through mysterious incantations
from neo-liberal prophets” (p. 97). As for Black Economic Empowerment, it was this
corrupt  “crony  capitalism”  (p. 100)  that  probably  provoked  the  Landless  People’s
Movement  (p. 101)  and  the  Economic  Freedom  Fighters  (p. 157)  into  South  Africa’s
contemporary dialectic of rich and poor.
11 The personification of that dialectical antithesis would be his Zulu nemesis Jacob Zuma,
whose native populism defeated Mbeki’s elitism in a struggle for control of the ruling
party.  Mbeki  was  a  Coriolanus  undermined  by  his  own  character,  Adebajo  argues
(p. 24), who was forced out of office in 2008 along with his “Xhosa Nostra” (p. 107) of
insiders  (members  of  his  ethnic  group  who  were  overrepresented  on  his  cabinet).
“Zuma  relied  on  guile  and  a  better  understanding  of  popular  politics  to  mobilise
support for his spectacular victory at the ANC’s Polokwane conference in December
2007” (p. 110).
12 This biography manages to reach a balance between those who praise Mbeki and those
who come to bury him. Ali  Mazrui famously wrote that Nkrumah was a great Pan-
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African but not a great Ghanaian.  Adebajo asks his  readers—will  Mbeki  come to be
viewed in a similar vein? (p. 164).
13 There are few weaknesses in this portrait of Mbeki, except for those inherent to the
structural limitations of this small volume-format published by Ohio and the subject of
the biography. The book is simply divided into seven brief chapters and is meant as an
introduction, not a definitive study. A small book is limited structurally but, in this
case, mostly by the fact that the subject is still alive and that Adebajo had no special
access to Mbeki’s personal papers or archives. The paucity of records, despite the fact
that  Mbeki’s  post-presidential  life  is  one of  a  retired politician,  aged 77,  no longer
politically  active,  impedes  the  author  from  drawing  proper  conclusions  on  the
historical importance of the man. Herodotus advised us never to judge a man’s life until
it is over. Brian Pottinger in The Mbeki Legacy (Johannesburg, Penguin, 2010) managed
to write an extensive compendium of Mbeki’s political legacy a decade ago, but still not
of  the man and his  life  history.  Until  his  private papers,  diaries,  letters,  and other
personal life records are made available, this small volume by Adebajo stands to outline
the importance of Mbeki as a key political figure, useful as the introductory sketch it
was meant to  be,  while  we await  an exhaustive life  history in the style  of  Herbert
Lottman in coming years.
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